

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
17TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND
FOR BROWARD COUNTY,
FLORIDA

Case No: 12-034121(07)
Complex Litigation Unit

P&S ASSOCIATES, GENERAL PARTNERSHIP,
et al.,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

JANET A. HOOKER CHARITABLE TRUST,
et al.,

Defendants.

ANSWER AND DEFENSES TO AMENDED COMPLAINT
OF DEFENDANTS SUSAN E. MOLCHAN OR THOMAS A. WHITEMAN, JANET B.
MOLCHAN TRUST DTD 05/19/94 AND ALEX E. MOLCHAN TRUST DTD 05/19/94

ANSWER

Defendants SUSAN E. MOLCHAN OR THOMAS A. WHITEMAN (“SUSAN MOLCHAN”), JANET B. MOLCHAN TRUST DTD 05/19/94 (“JANET MOLCHAN”) and ALEX E. MOLCHAN TRUST DTD 05/19/94 (“ALEX MOLCHAN” and, collectively with SUSAN MOLCHAN and JANET MOLCHAN, the “Molchan Defendants”), answer the numbered paragraphs of the Amended Complaint as follows:

1. Admitted, except denied that all events giving rise to the claims alleged occurred in Broward County, Florida.
2. Admitted.
3. Admitted.

4. Without knowledge and therefore denied.
5. Without knowledge and therefore denied.
6. Without knowledge and therefore denied.
7. Without knowledge and therefore denied.
8. Without knowledge and therefore denied.
9. Without knowledge and therefore denied.
10. Without knowledge and therefore denied.
11. Without knowledge and therefore denied.
12. Without knowledge and therefore denied.
13. Without knowledge and therefore denied.
14. Without knowledge and therefore denied.
15. Without knowledge and therefore denied.
16. Without knowledge and therefore denied.
17. Without knowledge and therefore denied.
18. Without knowledge and therefore denied.
19. Without knowledge and therefore denied.
20. Without knowledge and therefore denied.
21. Without knowledge and therefore denied.
22. Without knowledge and therefore denied.
23. Admitted.
24. Admitted.
25. Without knowledge and therefore denied.
26. Without knowledge and therefore denied.

27. Without knowledge and therefore denied.
28. Without knowledge and therefore denied.
29. Without knowledge and therefore denied.
30. Without knowledge and therefore denied.
31. Without knowledge and therefore denied.
32. Without knowledge and therefore denied.
33. Admitted.
34. Denied that Exhibit A is a detailed list of the distributions and disbursements to the accounts at P&S of the Molchan Defendants. The Molchan Defendants state affirmatively that Exhibit A omits distributions attributable to monies received by P&S from Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities, LLC (“BLMIS”).
35. Without knowledge and therefore denied.
36. Admitted.
37. The Amended and Restated P&S Partnership Agreement (the “P&S Partnership Agreement”) speaks for itself; otherwise, without knowledge and therefore denied.
38. The Molchan Defendants reiterate their answers to paragraphs 23, 24, 33 and 34; otherwise, denied.
39. Admitted that all of the funds invested in P&S by the Molchan Defendants were then invested with BLMIS; otherwise; without knowledge and therefore denied.
40. The P&S Partnership Agreement speaks for itself; otherwise, without knowledge and therefore denied.

41. The P&S Partnership Agreement speaks for itself; denied that Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of the P&S Partnership Agreement because the signature pages and Exhibit A to it have been omitted; otherwise, without knowledge and therefore denied.
42. The P&S Partnership Agreement speaks for itself; otherwise, without knowledge and therefore denied.
43. The P&S Partnership Agreement speaks for itself; otherwise, without knowledge and therefore denied.
44. The P&S Partnership Agreement speaks for itself; otherwise, without knowledge and therefore denied. The Molchan Defendants state affirmatively that Article Ten of the P&S Partnership Agreement has no application to them because they withdrew and dissociated from P&S more than 12 years ago pursuant to Article Nine of the P&S Partnership Agreement and Fla. Stat. § 620.8701. Upon their withdrawal and dissociation from P&S, a full settlement, accord and satisfaction of their accounts with P&S was made in accordance with Section 9.03 and Article 11 of the P&S Partnership Agreement and Fla. Stat. § 620.8701.
45. The P&S Partnership Agreement speaks for itself; denied that the Molchan Defendants violated any of the provisions of Article Ten of the P&S Partnership Agreement.
46. The P&S Partnership Agreement speaks for itself; denied that the Molchan Defendants ever defaulted under the provisions of Article Ten of the P&S Partnership Agreement or that their partnership interest in P&S was ever “assigned, transferred or terminated” within the meaning of Article Ten of the P&S Partnership Agreement.
47. The Order speaks for itself; otherwise, without knowledge and therefore denied.
48. Denied as to the Molchan Defendants.

49. Denied that the Molchan Defendants received any distributions that were not made from the monies P&S received from BLMIS; otherwise, without knowledge and therefore denied.
50. Denied as to the Molchan Defendants.
51. Denied that the Molchan Defendants received any improper distributions from P&S; admitted that the Molchan Defendants received Demand Letters from Smith in the form attached as Exhibit D; otherwise, without knowledge and therefore denied.
52. The form of the Demand Letter speaks for itself; denied that the Molchan Defendants received any improper distributions from P&S.
53. Denied as to the Molchan Defendants.
54. Denied that the Molchan Defendants received any improper distributions from P&S; otherwise, without knowledge and therefore denied.
55. Without knowledge and therefore denied.
56. Without knowledge and therefore denied.
57. Without knowledge and therefore denied.
58. Admitted.
59. Admitted.
60. Admitted.
61. Admitted.
62. The Order Appointing Conservator speaks for itself; otherwise, without knowledge and therefore denied.
63. The Conservator's Motion for Summary Judgment in the Interpleader Action speaks for itself; otherwise, without knowledge and therefore denied.

64. Denied that the issues raised in the Interpleader Action involved anything other than the method of distributing available cash assets to the current partners of P&S and S&P. Denied that the adjudication of the Interpleader Action has any bearing on the alleged liability of the Molchan Defendants in this action.
65. Denied that the issues raised in the Interpleader Action involved anything other than the method of distributing available cash assets to the current partners of P&S and S&P. Denied that the adjudication of the Interpleader Action has any bearing on the alleged liability of the Molchan Defendants in this action.
66. Denied as to the Molchan Defendants.
67. Denied as to the Molchan Defendants.
68. Denied as to the Molchan Defendants.
69. Admitted that the attorneys for Conservator sent demand letters to the Molchan Defendants on October 18, 2013; denied that such demand letters were sent out because P&S is “in the process of winding up.” The Molchan Defendants state affirmatively that such demand letters were a pretext to state a non-existent causes of action against them under Fla. Stat. § 620.8807 and Article Ten of the P&S Partnership Agreement, neither of which has any application to them because they withdrew and dissociated from P&S more than 12 years ago pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 620.8701 and Article Nine of the P&S Partnership Agreement.
70. Admitted as to the Molchan Defendants; otherwise, without knowledge and therefore denied.
71. Denied as to Molchan Defendants; otherwise, without knowledge and therefore denied.

72. Denied that P&S or the Conservator is a proper party to assert claims on behalf of partners in P&S who are creditors of P&S; otherwise, admitted.

73. Without knowledge and therefore denied.

COUNT I
BREACH OF STATUTORY DUTY (NEGLIGENCE)

74. The Molchan Defendants reiterate their answers to paragraphs 1 through 73 and incorporate those answers herein by this reference.

75. Denied as to the Molchan Defendants. In this regard, the Molchan Defendants state affirmatively that upon their withdrawal and dissociation from P&S, a full settlement, accord and satisfaction of their accounts with P&S was made in accordance with Section 9.03 and Article 11 of the P&S Partnership Agreement and in accordance with Fla. Stat. § 620.8701. At that time, their account balances were zero and they ceased to have capital accounts with P&S thereafter. Any purported capital accounts generated with respect to them since Margaret Smith was appointed “Managing General Partner” of P&S are a recent invention created by the Plaintiffs for the purposes of this litigation.

76. Denied that the Molchan Defendants are currently partners in P&S. In this regard, the Molchan Defendants state affirmatively that they already settled their P&S accounts more than 12 years ago.

77. Denied as to the Molchan Defendants. In this regard, the Molchan Defendants state affirmatively that all distributions received by them from P&S were taken in good faith and for a reasonably equivalent value, which value consisted of the antecedent debt to them reflected on the books and/or financial records of P&S. Upon their withdrawal and

dissociation from P&S, a full settlement, accord and satisfaction of their accounts with P&S was made in accordance with Section 9.03 and Article 11 of the P&S Partnership Agreement and in accordance with Fla. Stat. § 620.8701. Consequently, Fla. Stat. § 620.8807 is not applicable to the Molchan Defendants pursuant to the express terms of Fla. Stat. § 620.8603(1) and because they are no longer partners in P&S.

78. Denied as to the Molchan Defendants.

79. Denied as to the Molchan Defendants.

80. Denied as to the Molchan Defendants.

81. Denied as to the Molchan Defendants.

82. Denied as to the Molchan Defendants.

WHEREFORE, the Molchan Defendants demand dismissal of Count I of the Amended Complaint with prejudice and request court costs and such other and additional relief as the Court deems just and proper.

COUNT II
BREACH OF CONTRACT

83. The Molchan Defendants reiterate their answers to paragraphs 1 through 73 and incorporate those answers herein by this reference.

84. Without knowledge and therefore denied.

85. Denied as to the Molchan Defendants. In this regard, the Molchan Defendants state affirmatively that all distributions received by them from P&S were taken in good faith and for a reasonably equivalent value, which value consisted of the antecedent debt to them reflected on the books and/or financial records of P&S. Upon their withdrawal and dissociation from P&S, a full settlement, accord and satisfaction of their accounts with

P&S was made in accordance with Section 9.03 and Article 11 of the P&S Partnership Agreement and Fla. Stat. § 620.8701. Such withdrawal was not a “termination” of their partnership interest within the meaning of Section 10.02 of the P&S Partnership Agreement. Consequently, Sections 10.01(a) and (b) of the P&S Partnership Agreement are not applicable to the Molchan Defendants because they are no longer partners in P&S.

86. Denied as to the Molchan Defendants. In this regard, the Molchan Defendants state affirmatively that all distributions received by them from P&S were taken in good faith and for a reasonably equivalent value, which value consisted of the antecedent debt to them reflected on the books and/or financial records of P&S. Upon their withdrawal and dissociation from P&S, a full settlement, accord and satisfaction of their accounts with P&S was made in accordance with Section 9.03 and Article 11 of the P&S Partnership Agreement and Fla. Stat. § 620.8701. Such withdrawal was not a “termination” of their partnership interest within the meaning of Section 10.02 of the P&S Partnership Agreement. Moreover, pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 620.8701(4), P&S must indemnify the Molchan Defendants against partnership liabilities, whether incurred before or after their dissociation. Consequently, the refusal of the Molchan Defendants to accede to the demands of the Plaintiffs in this lawsuit cannot reasonably be interpreted as “COMMITTING OR PARTICIPATING IN AN INJURIOUS ACT OF FRAUD, GROSS NEGLIGENCE, MISREPRESENTATION, EMBEZZLEMENT OR DISHONESTY AGAINST THE PARTNERSHIP, OR COMMITTING OR PARTICIPATING IN ANY OTHER INJURIOUS ACT OR OMISSION WANTONLY, WILLFULLY, RECKLESSLY, OR IN A MANNER WHICH WAS GROSSLY NEGLIGENT

AGAINST THE PARTNERSHIP, MONETARILY OR OTHERWISE, OR BEING CONVICTED OF ANY ACT OR ACTS CONSTITUTING A FELONY OR MISDEMEANOR, OTHER THAN TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS, UNDER THE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OR ANY STATE THEREOF” within the meaning of Section 10.01(g) of the P&S Partnership Agreement.

87. Denied as to the Molchan Defendants.

88. Denied as to the Molchan Defendants.

WHEREFORE, the Molchan Defendants demand dismissal of Count II of the Amended Complaint with prejudice and request court costs and such other and additional relief as the Court deems just and proper.

COUNT III
UNJUST ENRICHMENT

89. The Molchan Defendants reiterate their answers to paragraphs 1 through 35, 38 through 40, 42, 47, 49, 51, 52, 54, 55 through 65 and 68 through 73, and incorporate those answers herein by this reference.

90. Denied as to the Molchan Defendants.

91. Denied as to the Molchan Defendants.

92. Denied as to the Molchan Defendants.

93. Denied as to the Molchan Defendants.

94. Denied as to the Molchan Defendants. In this regard, the Molchan Defendants state affirmatively that all distributions received by them from P&S were taken in good faith and for a reasonably equivalent value, which value consisted of the antecedent debt to them reflected on the books and/or financial records of P&S. Upon their withdrawal and

dissociation from P&S, a full settlement, accord and satisfaction of their accounts with P&S was made in accordance with Section 9.03 and Article 11 of the P&S Partnership Agreement and Fla. Stat. § 620.8701.

95. Denied as to the Molchan Defendants.

WHEREFORE, the Molchan Defendants demand dismissal of Count III of the Amended Complaint with prejudice and request court costs and such other and additional relief as the Court deems just and proper.

COUNT IV
MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED

96. The Molchan Defendants reiterate their answers to paragraphs 1 through 35, 38 through 40, 42, 47, 49, 51, 52, 54, 55 through 65 and 68 through 73, and incorporate those answers herein by this reference.

97. Denied as to the Molchan Defendants.

98. Denied as to the Molchan Defendants.

99. Denied as to the Molchan Defendants.

100. Denied as to the Molchan Defendants.

101. Denied as to the Molchan Defendants. In this regard, the Molchan Defendants state affirmatively that all distributions received by them from P&S were taken in good faith and for a reasonably equivalent value, which value consisted of the antecedent debt to them reflected on the books and/or financial records of P&S. Upon their withdrawal and dissociation from P&S, a full settlement, accord and satisfaction of their accounts with P&S was made in accordance with Section 9.03 and Article 11 of the P&S Partnership Agreement and Fla. Stat. § 620.8701.

102. Denied as to the Molchan Defendants.

WHEREFORE, the Molchan Defendants demand dismissal of Count IV of the Amended Complaint with prejudice and request court costs and such other and additional relief as the Court deems just and proper.

COUNT V
AVOIDANCE OF FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS
PURSUANT TO SECTION 726.105(1)(a) OF THE FLORIDA STATUTES

103. The Molchan Defendants reiterate their answers to paragraphs 1 through 73 and incorporate those answers herein by this reference.

104. The P&S Partnership Agreement speaks for itself; otherwise, without knowledge and therefore denied.

105. Denied as to the Molchan Defendants. Also denied that the Plaintiffs have standing to assert claims on behalf of individual partners in P&S.

106. Denied as to the Molchan Defendants. Also denied that the Plaintiffs have standing to assert claims on behalf of individual partners in P&S.

107. Denied as to the Molchan Defendants. In this regard, the Molchan Defendants state affirmatively that all distributions received by them from P&S were taken in good faith and for a reasonably equivalent value within the meaning of Section 726.109(1) of the Florida Statutes, which value consisted of the antecedent debt to them reflected on the books and/or financial records of P&S. Upon their withdrawal and dissociation from P&S, a full settlement, accord and satisfaction of their accounts with P&S was made in accordance with Section 9.03 and Article 11 of the P&S Partnership Agreement and Fla. Stat. §620.8701.

108. Denied as to the Molchan Defendants.

WHEREFORE, the Molchan Defendants demand dismissal of Count V of the Amended Complaint with prejudice and request court costs and such other and additional relief as the Court deems just and proper.

The Molchan Defendants deny all allegations of the Amended Complaint not specifically admitted herein.

DEFENSES

I. FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION

1. Count I of the Amended Complaint fails to state a cause of action under Fla. Stat. § 620.8807 as to the Molchan Defendant because Composite Exhibit A to the Amended Complaint shows that the Molchan Defendants withdrew and dissociated from P&S more than 12 years ago in accordance with Fla. Stat. §620.8701. The Amended Complaint does not (and cannot) allege that such dissociation resulted in the dissolution and winding up of the partnership business. Consequently, under the express terms of Fla. Stat. §620.8603(1), Fla. Stat. §620.8807 cannot be applicable to the Molchan Defendants.
2. Count II of the Amended Complaint fails to state a cause of action against the Molchan Defendants because Sections 4.04, 5.01 and 5.02 of the P&S Partnership Agreement provide no contractual basis for their alleged liability. Similarly, Article Ten of the P&S Partnership Agreement provides no contractual basis for any such liability because Composite Exhibit A shows that the Molchan Defendants withdrew and dissociated from P&S more than 12 years ago. Such withdrawal and dissociation cannot be construed as a “termination” of their partnership interest within the meaning of Section 10.02 of the P&S Partnership Agreement. Consequently, since they are not currently partners in P&S, Article Ten can have not application to them. Furthermore, Section 10(g) of the P&S

Partnership Agreement is not applicable to the Molchan Defendants in any event because their refusal to accede to the demands of the Plaintiffs in this lawsuit cannot reasonably be interpreted as “COMMITTING OR PARTICIPATING IN AN INJURIOUS ACT OF FRAUD, GROSS NEGLIGENCE, MISREPRESENTATION, EMBEZZLEMENT OR DISHONESTY AGAINST THE PARTNERSHIP, OR COMMITTING OR PARTICIPATING IN ANY OTHER INJURIOUS ACT OR OMISSION WANTONLY, WILLFULLY, RECKLESSLY, OR IN A MANNER WHICH WAS GROSSLY NEGLIGENT AGAINST THE PARTNERSHIP, MONETARILY OR OTHERWISE, OR BEING CONVICTED OF ANY ACT OR ACTS CONSTITUTING A FELONY OR MISDEMEANOR, OTHER THAN TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS, UNDER THE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OR ANY STATE THEREOF” within the meaning of Section 10(g) of the P&S Partnership Agreement.

3. Count V of the Amended Complaint fails to state a cause of action against the Molchan Defendants under Chapter 726 of the Florida Statutes, Florida’s Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. Section 726.105(1)(a) of that Act does not, in and of itself, create a cause of action to avoid or seek repayment of “fraudulent transfers” defined therein. Instead, the only cause of action created by the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act is set forth in Section 726.108(1) of that statute, which provides that only a “creditor” of a debtor that has made a “fraudulent transfer” may bring an action to avoid that transfer. In the present case, the Plaintiffs are P&S, which made the allegedly fraudulent transfers, and the Conservator. Since P&S is not “creditor” of itself and since the Conservator “stands in the shoes” of P&S, the only “creditors” of the P&S mentioned in Count V are certain unnamed partners in P&S, but they are not parties to this lawsuit and neither P&S nor the

Conservator have standing to bring claims on their behalf, particularly considering the fact that P&S is the “debtor” that made the “fraudulent transfers” alleged in the Count V. Consequently, the Plaintiffs have not and cannot state a cause of action under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act against the Molchan Defendants. See *In re: Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities*, 2013 WL 3064848 (2d Cir. June 20, 2013).

II. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

1. STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS

Composite Exhibit A to the Amended Complaint shows that the Molchan Defendants received their last distributions from and ceased to be Partners in P&S in the following years, respectively:

ALEX MOLCHAN – last distribution:	1998
SUSAN MOLCHAN – last distribution:	1999
JANET MOLCHAN – last distribution:	2001

The claims presented in the various Counts of the Amended Complaint allegedly arise out of the Molchan Defendants receiving those and earlier distributions. The applicable statutes of limitations for these Counts are as follows:

Count I: either under Fla. Stat. §95.11(2)(b), within five (5) years, or Fla. Stat. §95.11(3)(p), within four (4) years;

Count II: under Fla. Stat. §95.11(2)(b), within five (5) years;

Count III: under Fla. Stat. §95.11(3)(p), within four (4) years;

Count IV: under Fla. Stat. §95.11(3)(p), within four (4) years

Count V: under Fla. Stat. §726.110(1), within 4 years after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred or, if later, within 1 year after the transfer or obligation was or could reasonably have been discovered by the claimant.

In the present case, the all of the distributions to the Molchan Defendants occurred more than 12 years before the filing of the Complaint, with the exception of the last distribution to JANET MOLCHAN, which occurred more than 11 years before the filing of the Complaint. Furthermore, P&S clearly knew about its own distributions to the Molchan Defendants all along and the Conservator “stands in the shoes” of the Partnerships with regard to such knowledge. Moreover, the BLMIS scandal gained worldwide notoriety in December of 2008 and the fact that P&S had been an investor in BLMIS became a matter of public record in February of 2009 when P&S filed its multi-million dollar SIPC claim in the BLMIS liquidation. At that time, the fact that partners who had withdrawn and dissociated from P&S before December of 2008 would have been so-called “net winners” was known or was reasonably discoverable to anyone who had, or had previously had, an interest in P&S. Consequently, the Plaintiffs clearly discovered or could have reasonably discovered the “fraudulent transfers” alleged in the Amended Complaint more than 1 year before the filing of the Complaint in this case. Therefore, the claims presented in Count IV of the Amended Complaint are clearly barred by the provisions of Fla. Stat. §726.110(1).

Likewise, the “delayed discovery” provisions of Fla. Stat. §95.031(2)(a) are of no avail to the Plaintiffs because such provisions are inapplicable to the various Counts of the Amended Complaint due to the fact that none of them is “an action founded upon fraud” under Fla. Stat. §95.11(3). There are no legally tenable allegations of fraud or constructive fraud against the Molchan Defendants and, if there were, they would in any event be barred absolutely by the 12-

year statute of repose provisions of Fla. Stat. §95.031(2)(a), with the exception of any related to the final distribution to JANET MOLCHAN. In this regard, the allegation in Count I of the Amended Complaint that the Molchan Defendants violated Section 10(g) of the P&S Partnership Agreement does not convert Count I into “an action founded on fraud” because the refusal of the Molchan Defendants to accede to the demands of the Plaintiffs in this lawsuit cannot reasonably be characterized as a “fraudulent” act.

Moreover, there can be no “common law” or “equitable” basis for the application of a “delayed discovery” exception to the operation of these statutes of limitations in barring the various Counts of the Amended Complaint. Aside from provisions for the delayed accrual of a cause of action in cases of fraud, products liability, professional and medical malpractice, and intentional torts based on abuse, there is no other statutory basis for the delayed discovery rule. To hold otherwise would result in courts rewriting the statute, and, in fact, obliterating the statute. *Davis v. Monahan*, 832 So.2d 708, 710-711 (Fla. 2002). Thus, all of the claims asserted in the Amended Complaint against the Molchan Defendants are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations.¹

2. LIMITATIONS ON LIABILITY IN P&S PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT

Section 14.03 of the P&S Partnership Agreement provides, in part, that:

THE PARTNERS SHALL HAVE NO LIABILITY TO THE PARTNERSHIP OR TO ANY OTHER PARTNER FOR ANY MISTAKES OR ERRORS IN JUDGMENT, NOR FOR ANY ACT OR OMISSIONS BELIEVED IN GOOD FAITH TO BE WITHIN THE SCOPE OF

¹ Plaintiffs apparently made their October 18, 2013 demands on the Defendants as a pretext to restart the running of the Statute of Limitations from that date by characterizing that “demand” as an essential element of some or all of causes of action asserted. Such “demand” is more properly characterized as, at best, a mere condition precedent; to hold otherwise would allow the public policy considerations underlying the Statutes of Limitation to be obliterated at the whim of artful plaintiffs.

AUTHORITY CONFERRED BY THIS AGREEMENT. THE PARTNERS SHALL BE LIABLE ONLY FOR ACTS AND/OR OMISSIONS INVOLVING INTENTIONAL WRONGDOING, FRAUD, AND BREACHES OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CARE AND LOYALTY.

All distributions received by the Molchan Defendants from P&S were taken in good faith and for a reasonably equivalent value, which value consisted of the antecedent debt to them reflected on the books and/or financial records of P&S. Upon their withdrawal and dissociation from P&S, a full settlement, accord and satisfaction of their accounts with P&S was made in accordance with Section 9.03 and Article 11 of the P&S Partnership Agreement and Fla. Stat. §620.8701. Consequently, the refusal of the Molchan Defendants to accede to the demands of the Plaintiffs in this lawsuit cannot reasonably be interpreted as an “ACT AND/OR OMISSION INVOLVING INTENTIONAL WRONGDOING, FRAUD, OR A BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CARE AND LOYALTY.” Therefore, the Limitations on Liability in Section 14.03 of the P&S Partnership Agreement bars all of the claims of the Plaintiffs asserted against the Molchan Defendants set forth in the Amended Complaint in this action.

3. ACCORD AND SATISFACTION

All distributions received by the Molchan Defendants from P&S were taken in good faith and for a reasonably equivalent value, which value consisted of the antecedent debt to them reflected on the books and/or financial records of P&S. Upon their withdrawal and dissociation from P&S, a full settlement, accord and satisfaction of their accounts with P&S was made in accordance with Section 9.03 and Article 11 of the P&S Partnership Agreement and Fla. Stat. §620.8701. Consequently, all of the claims of the Plaintiffs set forth in the Amended Complaint against the Molchan Defendants are barred by the doctrine of Accord and Satisfaction.

4. INDEMNIFICATION

All distributions received by the Molchan Defendants from P&S were taken in good faith and for a reasonably equivalent value, which value consisted of the antecedent debt to them reflected on the books and/or financial records of P&S. Upon their withdrawal and dissociation from P&S, a full settlement, accord and satisfaction of their accounts with P&S was made in accordance with Section 9.03 and Article 11 of the P&S Partnership Agreement and Fla. Stat. §620.8701. Consequently, P&S was and is obligated to indemnify the Molchan Defendants “against all partnership liabilities, whether incurred before or after dissociation” pursuant to the provisions of Fla. Stat. §620.8701(4). The Plaintiffs seek money from the Molchan Defendants to pay creditors of P&S. Therefore, all of the claims of the Plaintiffs set forth in the Amended Complaint against the Molchan Defendants are barred by such statutory indemnification obligation.

WHEREFORE, the Molchan Defendants demand dismissal of the claims against them set forth in the Amended Complaint with prejudice and request court costs and such other and additional relief as the Court deems just and proper.

Dated: November 21, 2013

Respectfully submitted,

Michael R. Casey
Attorney for Molchan Defendants
SUSAN E. MOLCHAN OR THOMAS A.
WHITEMAN, JANET B. MOLCHAN TRUST
DTD 05/19/94 and ALEX E. MOLCHAN
TRUST DTD 05/19/94
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_____/s/_____
Michael R. Casey, Florida Bar No. 217727

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served upon counsel of record by email to the following email addresses this 20th day of November 2013:

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_____/s/_____
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